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PECKING ORDER VERSUS TRADE-OFF: AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH TO 
THE SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISE CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
Francisco Sogorb-Mira and José López-Gracia 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we explore two of the most relevant theories that explain financial 
policy in small and medium enterprises (SMEs): pecking order theory and trade-off 
theory. Panel data methodology is used to test the empirical hypotheses over a sample 
of 6482 Spanish SMEs during the five-year period 1994–1998. The results suggest that 
both theoretical approaches contribute to explain capital structure in SMEs. However, 
while we find evidence that SMEs attempt to achieve a target or optimum leverage 
(trade-off model), there is less support for the view that SMEs adjust their leverage level 
to their financing requirements (pecking order model). 
Keywords: Pecking Order, Trade-off, Capital Structure, Small and Medium 
Enterprises, Panel Data. 
JEL: C34, G32, G33. 
 
RESUMEN 
En este trabajo, exploramos dos de las teorías más relevantes que explican la 
política de financiación de la pequeña y mediana empresa: la selección jerárquica y el 
equilibrio estático. El contraste de hipótesis se lleva a cabo con metodología de datos de 
panel, a partir de una muestra de 6482 pymes españolas, que presentan información 
financiera a lo largo del periodo 1994-1998. Los resultados indican que ambos enfoques 
contribuyen a explicar la estructura de capital de las pymes, si bien mientras que se 
confirma la existencia de un endeudamiento objetivo u óptimo que estas empresas tratan 
de alcanzar (modelo de equilibrio estático), no parece quedar claro que ajusten su nivel 
de deuda a sus necesidades de financiación (modelo de selección jerárquica). 
Palabras clave: selección jerárquica, equilibrio estático, estructura de capital, 
pymes, datos de panel. 
   3
1. Introduction 
The vast majority of empirical studies that analyse the determinants of firm 
financing usually examine large publicly listed companies with a widely spread 
ownership. These companies often raise finance by issuing corporate debt on the capital 
markets (Zingales, 2000, p. 1629). In this paper, we examine the financing of small and 
medium sized companies (SMEs) and explore whether the main theories of firm 
financing can explain the capital structure of these firms. 
SMEs often suffer the problems associated with asymmetric information, such as 
adverse selection and moral hazard. In this way, they are affected by the typical 
problems studied in the theory of pecking order. Nevertheless, these firms could also set 
their financial policy by following a target indebtedness ratio, as maintained by trade-
off theory. As both theories, pecking order and trade-off, enable us to describe the 
financial behaviour of SMEs with some accuracy, we develop the behavioural models 
necessary to analyse which of the two theories best fits the characteristics of these 
companies and explains their actions. 
Our starting point is that established by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), when 
developing the analysis of SME financing. This point has been adapted to our specific 
context, and following the lines suggested by Chirinko and Singha (2000), we propose 
alternative verification methods in order to give our results greater robustness. 
A revision of the empirical literature leads us to conclude that there is 
insufficient clarity in the degree of applicability of the various theories of firm leverage. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) clearly arrive at the same conclusion, while Graham (1996) 
asks why we cannot better empirically explain firm leverage – given the wide number of 
available theories. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) argue that a possible solution to 
this question may arise from a meticulous study of the predictions associated with each 
theory, rather than an attempt to simultaneously collect together all the theories. This 
provides the motivation for our proposal to centre an empirical analysis on a model 
representing trade-off, and another representing pecking order. 
Our research exploits the characteristics of data panel and incorporates dynamic 
effects, while controlling temporary, as well as specific unobservable company effects.   4
As a result, we obtain a base that is more appropriate for analysing the financial 
decisions taken by SMEs. 
The rest of the paper has been organised as follows. Sections 2 and 3 tackle the 
theoretical foundations of pecking order and trade-off. The available literature and 
hypotheses to be verified are also discussed. In Section 4, the process of sample 
selection is explained and the data is also described. Section 5 covers the methodology 
used and discusses the principal problems of estimating with panel data models. Section 
6 presents the results obtained and verifies the defined hypotheses. Lastly, section 7 
sums up the main conclusions of the research. 
2. Trade-off  model 
A. Background and theoretical foundation 
In this theoretical framework, companies identify their optimal capital structure 
and weigh up the advantages and disadvantages of an additional monetary unit of debt. 
Among the advantages, we can include costs that are ‘fiscally deductible’ from 
company tax as a result of paying interests (Modigliani and Miller, 1963; DeAngelo and 
Masulis, 1980); and a lessening of the free cash flow problem (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 
1990). The disadvantages of debt include the potential costs resulting from financial 
distress (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973; Kim, 1978), and the agency costs arising 
between owners and financial creditors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977). At 
the optimal point for the company capital structure, the benefits and shortcomings of 
debt are balanced – so achieving equilibrium. Myers (1984) showed that the trade-off 
approach implied that the rate of real company indebtedness reverts to a target, or 
optimal level. 
Following this line of reasoning, we propose verifying the prediction of the 
trade-off theory with respect to the reversion of leverage towards an objective, or 
optimal point; and estimate the speed with which this adjustment is made. As Fama and 
French (2002) show, empirical studies made within the framework of trade-off theory 
and aimed at identifying the determinants of company indebtedness normally estimate a 
simple cross-section regression – estimating the relation existing between the ratios of 
observed debt and a set of explanatory variables using non-dynamic models (vid, for 
example, Bradley et al., 1984, Titman and Wessels, 1988, and Rajan and Zingales,   5
1995). This type of approach suffers two limitations: (i) observed debt does not 
necessarily have to be identified with optimal debt, as this implies ignoring the 
difficulties companies suffer when adjusting their capital structure (Myers, 1977); and 
(ii) static empirical analysis is unable to explain the dynamic nature of company capital, 
that is to say, it does not really examine whether company debt shows a reversion to a 
given objective optimal level, and how quickly this reversion occurs. In fact, there are 
relatively few papers that analyse the dynamic aspect of capital structure and among 
them we can highlight: Lev and Pekelman (1975), Ang (1976), Taggart (1977), Marsh 
(1982), Jalilvand and Harris (1984), Auerbach (1985), Opler and Titman (1993) and 
Allen and Clissold (1998), although with fairly small sample. More recently we can 
point to: Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Banerjee et al. (2000), Ozkan (2000), 
Hovakimian et al. (2001), Miguel and Pindado (2001), Nuri and Archer (2001), Omet 
(2001), Ozkan (2001), Antoniou et al. (2002) and Fama and French (2002). 
In a perfect world, without transaction and adjustment costs, companies would 
automatically respond to any variation of their debt objective by increasing or 
decreasing the capital. So, in a given moment of time t, the observed debt of a given 
company, (Dit), should not differ from its debt target (D
*
it), that is, Dit=D
*
it. 
Nevertheless, in reality there are considerable transaction costs that impede companies 
from completely reaching D
*
it, so the adjustment is, in this case, partial. We can 
represent this process using the following partial adjustment model: 
*
it it-1 it it it-1 D- D = λ (D - D ) ⋅         [ 1 ]  
Dit being the ratio of total observed leverage, D
*
it the ratio of target debt, and λ it 
its speed of adjustment. The equation [1] establishes up to which point the desired 
adjustment (from the debt ratio in t-1 to the target ratio in t) depends on its adjustment 
parameter λ it. According to the trade-off theory, this adjustment coefficient should have 
an appreciably positive value – near to 1. If λ it = 1, this implies that the real debt 
coincides with the debt objective, that is, the capital structure of the company instantly 
and continuously adjusts to its objective value. As λ it can vary in companies, and over 
time for the same company, only if λ it = 1 for all t can we safely state that company I is 
consistently reaching its debt objective (complete adjustment). If λ it < 1, the adjustment 
from the period t-1 to t, has only partially achieved its debt objective; on the other hand, 
if  λ it > 1, then an over-adjustment has occurred and the company has not achieved its 
capital structure objective. It should be noted that as λ it represents the degree of   6
adjustment for the period, it can also be seen as the adjustment speed, and in this way a 
high value for λ it indicates quicker adjustment. 
The estimation of the previous model can be undertaken with a two-stage 
regression analysis. As the debt objective is not directly observable, a proxy is used. 
The first stage consists of a regression analysis that incorporates those explanatory 
variables that correspond to those determinants of firm debt that are usually mentioned 
in the literature. In this way, a value that can serve as an estimation of the objective is 
obtained. For company i, in moment t, we will have the following equation:  
it
*
it k k i t it
k
D= a b V + c+ c+ e +⋅ ∑        [ 2 ]  
where the companies are represented by the sub-index i = 1,…, n, and time is shown as t 
= 1,…, T. Vk is the vector that takes in the k explanatory variables that correspond to 
the specific company characteristics. The terms bk represent the unknown parameters 
associated with earlier variables. ci are the specific unobservable individual effects for 
each company from the panel, and which do not vary over time, and are identically and 
independently distributed (iid) with a variance 
2
c σ . Examples of these effects include 
aspects of managerial behaviour such as motivation, skill and performance in the 
development of their functions, or attitudes towards risk. In addition, ci may include the 
specific effects of the economic sector where the firm operates, which is supposed to be 
constant over time, like entry barriers, conditions of the input market and the economic 
risk of the industry. The variable ct captures any specific temporal effect. These 
temporal effects include macroeconomic factors such as inflation, interest rates and 
demand shocks. Finally, eit is an error term, which captures possible measurement errors 
in the independent variables, and any other explanatory variables which have been 
omitted. It is assumed that these errors are identical and independently distributed (iid), 
according to a Normal distribution with zero mean and a constant variance 
( 2
it e e iid N(0,σ ) ≈ ). In addition, it is assumed that errors do not present serial correlation. 
Later, in the second stage, the adjusted values in the regression equation [2] are 
taken as a proxy of the target debt ratio in the estimation of the equation [1]. 
The verification of the static equilibrium theory can also be made in a single 
step, if we had previously and adequately combined equations [1] and [2]. In this way, 
substituting [2] in [1] and reorganising the terms of the resulting equation:   7
it it it it it-1 it k k it i it t it it
k
D= λ a+(1-λ )D + λ bV + λ c+ λ c+ λ e ⋅⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∑  
By simplifying the above equation we arrive at: 
it it it-1 k k i t it
k
D= D + β V+ η+η +ε δα +⋅ ⋅ ∑       [3] 
where  it λ a δ =⋅ , it (1 λ ) α =− , ki t k βλ b =⋅, ii t i ηλ c =⋅ , ti t t ηλ c =⋅  and  it it it ελ e =⋅ 
( it ε  has the same properties as  it e ). Note that the parameter of the variable 
corresponding to the debt ratio delayed by one period is 1 minus the adjustment 
coefficient, meaning the transaction costs. 
B. Hypotheses and variables 
The general hypotheses that we intend verifying with this model, as implied in 
equation [3], have been taken from the empirical literature and are as follows: 
(1)  “Companies follow a process of capital structure adjustment that leads to an 
optimal leverage level over the long-term” (Lev and Pekelman, 1975, Ang, 
1976, Taggart, 1977, and Jalilvand and Harris, 1984). 
The verification of this hypothesis is undertaken with an analysis of the 
estimated α  parameter. 
(2)  “The effective tax rate should be positively related to the debt level” (Haugen 
and Senbet, 1986, Scott, 1976, and DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). 
The verification of this hypothesis is made using the effective tax rate (ETR) 
variable, which is defined as the ratio between tax paid and earnings after 
interest and before tax (EAIBT). 
(3)  “Non–debt tax shields should be negatively related to firm debt” (DeAngelo and 
Masulis, 1980). 
This hypothesis can be verified using the non–debt tax shields (NDTS) variable, 
measured using the ratio between depreciation and assets. 
(4)  “Default risk should be negatively related to firm’s debt ratio” (Bradley et al., 
1984, and Mackie–Mason, 1990).   8
The variable default risk (DR) is obtained using the ratio between interest 
expenses and earnings before interest and tax (EBIT). 
(5)  “Companies with greater growth opportunities will have a greater potential 
problem of under investment associated with debt financing, and therefore, a 
smaller target debt ratio” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Myers, 1977, and Stulz, 
1990). 
This hypothesis is verified using the growth opportunities (GO) variable, 
defined as the quotient between the intangible assets and company assets. 
(6)  “Company debt is positively related with the tangibility of the assets” (Myers, 
1977, Scott, 1977, Myers and Majluf, 1984, Williamson, 1988, and Harris and 
Raviv, 1990). 
The asset structure (AS), proxy variable introduced to verify this hypothesis, is 
defined as the quotient between the tangible assets (fixed assets and inventories) 
and assets. 
(7)  “The size of the company should be positively related to the level of debt” (Ang, 
1992). 
The firm size (SIZE) is obtained using the natural logarithm of total assets, with 
the aim of controlling a possible non–linearity in the data, and the consequent 
problem of heteroskedasticity. 
(8)  “There should be a negative relationship between debt ratio and a firm’s 
profitability” (Myers, 1984). 
We define the variable profitability (ROA) as the quotient between EBIT and 
assets. 
(9)  “A firm’s liquidity affects the firm’s capital structure” (Ozkan, 2001). 
This hypothesis is verified using the liquidity proxy variable (LIQ), defined as 
the quotient between current assets and current liabilities.  
Table A.4 in the annex shows a summary of all the hypotheses defined in this 
research. Besides, Table A.2 describes in detail all the variables incorporated in the 
estimated models.   9
3.  Pecking order model 
A. Background and theoretical foundation 
The theory emerges as a result of asymmetric information existing in the 
financial markets, that is, corporate managers often have better information about the 
health of their companies than outside investors. Apart from the transaction costs of 
issuing new securities, companies have to accept the information costs arising from 
asymmetric information. In this way, new securities issued on the financial market 
could be infra–valued because of informational asymmetries, and this is especially true 
in the case of new equities. This implies that company managers may decide not to 
launch potentially profitable projects if they have to be financed by risky financial 
instruments (Myers and Majluf, 1984). At the same time, the director-owners of SMEs 
may decide not to seek finance that dilutes their shareholding in the company, and 
therefore limits their ability to act. 
Independently of the above, the theory predicts a hierarchical order in the 
financing policy of a company. This order begins with those financial sources that are 
least affected by the costs of information and offer, at the same time, less risk. The 
preferred source of financing is internally generated funds. This is followed by low risk 
short-term debt and then higher risk long term debt. The last option is new capital, and 
this is the financial source with the highest information costs (Donaldson, 1961; Myers, 
1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
From the perspective of this approach, changes in the level of debt are not 
motivated by the need to reach a given debt target, but are instead motivated by the need 
for external financing, once internal resources have been exhausted and assuming that 
opportunities for profitable investment exist. 
One way of testing this theory is by examining financing decisions made after 
short-term changes in profits and investments, that is, using the theoretical relationship 
between changes in the level of debt and a firm’s need for funds. We propose the 
following pecking order model – based on Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999).  
it it-1 it i t it D- D = β FD +η+η +ε α +⋅        [ 4 ]  
Dit being the ratio of total debt, FDit the financing deficit for period t, given by 
the difference between investment requirements (variation of fixed assets plus variation   10
of working capital) and the cash flow generated by the company (CF). We also include 
as a component of this deficit, the total of long term debt repayable in period t. This can 
be estimated from the difference between long-term debt in t-1 and in t. The financing 
deficit would be approximated as: 
FD=[  Fixed Assets+  Working Capital+  Long Term Debt] - CF ∆∆ ∆  [5] 
being,  ∆ Fixed Assets = Fixed Assetst – Fixed Assetst-1,  ∆ Working Capital = Working 
Capital t – Working Capital t-1,  ∆ Long Term Debt = Long Term Debtt – Long Term 
Debtt-1, CF = Earnings after taxes + Depreciation. 
The pecking order theory establishes that the level of debt should be adjusted to 
the financing needs of the company, taking as exogenous all the variables that form the 
earlier financing deficit. In this way, the debt is increased or decreased depending on 
whether the requirements of the investment exceed or not the available funds, 
respectively. 
Additionally, we will test the pecking order theory with the following 
regression: 
it 1 it 2 it 3 it i t it D= β (CF) +β (Age) +β (GO) +η+η +ε α +⋅ ⋅ ⋅     [6] 
being, D the total debt ratio, CF the firm’s cash flow, Age the natural logarithm of the 
company age in years, and GO the growth opportunities already defined in the previous 
section. All of these variables vary over time, and from company to company. 
B. Hypotheses and variables 
In equation [4], the hypotheses defined by the pecking order theory are: (i) α  = 
0 and (ii) β = 1, or approximately equal to 1, so that the variation in the level of debt 
coincides with the deficit ( D=FD ∆ ); that is, the financing deficit is completely covered 
by debt. The expression [4] implicitly supposes that companies have not increased their 
capital during the period under study. 
The hypotheses to be tested using the second pecking order model (equation 
[6]), are the following: 
(1)  “The level of firm’s debt should be negatively related to the volume of cash 
flow” (Myers, 1984, and Myers and Majluf, 1984).   11
(2)  “The age of a company should be negatively related to its debt level” (Weston 
and Brigham, 1981, and Petersen and Rajan, 1994). 
(3)  “Companies with few investment opportunities and high cash flows should have 
low debt levels, while companies with strong growth perspectives and reduced 
cash flows should have high debt ratios” (Myers, 1984). 
These hypotheses will be tested using the estimation of parameters 
corresponding to the implied variables, that is, β 1 for cash flows (CF), β 2 for Age, and 
β 3 for growth opportunities (GO). 
4. Data 
A. Sample selection 
The sample of SMEs chosen to make this study has been taken from the SABI 
(Sistema de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos) database, managed by Grupo Informa, S.A. 
This database contains economic and financial information on more than 190,000 
Spanish companies – from 1992 to the present. The firms in the sample meet the 
definition established by the European Commission for an SME (Recommendation 
96/280/EC, 3 April, 1996)
1. Firms showing extreme, or inconsistent figures, were 
excluded from the sample. Finally, the sample contained 6482 SMEs with complete 
information for the period 1994–1998, resulting in a data panel with 32,410 
observations. 
These firms are representative of Spanish SMEs because they cover all sectors, 
except financial and insurance due to their specific financial behaviour and particular 
nature. The industry classification criteria was adapted from the Spanish Economic 
Activities National Classification (CNAE–93, Real Decreto 1560/1992), adapted to the 
statistical notation of economic activities from the European Community (NACE). 
Table 1 shows this industry classification and the percentage represented by each sector 
in the whole sample. 
                                                 
1 (1) Less than 250 employees; (2) less than €40 million invoiced; (3) assets less than €27 million and (4) 
independent firm.   12
Table 1. Sample representation by sector 
  Sectors  Firms  % 
Sector 1  Agriculture and others  139  2.14 
Sector 2  Manufacturing   2053  31.67 
Sector 3  Electricity, Gas and Water   21  0.32 
Sector 4  Construction  667  10.29 
Sector 5  Commerce, vehicles and others   2630  40.57 
Sector 6  Hotel and catering   153  2.36 
Sector 7  Transport and communications   237  3.66 
Sector 8  Property and rental   445  6.87 
Sector 9  Education, health and others   137  2.11 
TOTAL   6482  100 
 
 
B. Description of the data 
Firm’s capital structure constitutes our dependent variable, and the principal 
objective of our research. Typically, it is measured using the two following ratios: 
•  Total debt ratio, Da: 
Total debt
Total debt Equities +
, whose possible values range 
between 0 and 1. 
•  Total debt ratio, Db: 
Total debt
Equities
, varying its potential values between 0 and 
+∞ . 
Below, we present in Table 2 the main descriptive statistics of these two 
leverage measures for all the observations. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of debt ratio 
Statistic  Total debt / (Total debt + Equities) (Da)  Total debt/ Equities (Db) 
Mean 0.614  4.071 
Standard deviation   0.229  12.308 
Maximum 0.999  851.853 
Minimum 0  0 
First quartile  0.457  0.859 
Second quartile  0.648  1.882 
Third quartile  0.799  4.088 
Skewness -0.511  36.496 
Kurtosis 2.431 2093.429 
 
In Table 2, we can see that the first of the ratios, Da, has an asymmetric 
distribution to the left and is moderately platikurtic; while the second, Db, is asymmetric 
to the right and shows a strong leptokurtosis. 
The evolution of the mean leverage ratio over the period of analysis, 1994–1998, 
for the global sample, shows a clear downward tendency, as can be seen in Table 3. 
This contrasts with the upward trend of the economy during this period. This 
phenomenon would appear to agree with the pecking order theory, because during 
economic booms companies tend to have greater internal resources and so require less 
external financing. 
Table 3. Mean leverage ratio by year 
  Total debt / (Total debt + Equities) (Da)  Total debt / Equities (Db) 
1994 0.6410  5.9251 
1995 0.6273  4.2843 
1996 0.6104  3.7141 
1997 0.6010  3.3694 
1998 0.5907  3.0610 
 
The main statistics of the explanatory variables are shown for the global set of 
observations in Table 4 below. 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables  
Variable  Mean  Standard 
deviation  Minimum  Maximum  Median  Skewness  Kurtosis 
ETR 0.2836  0.1165 0  0.9946  0.3196  -0.6059  6.4033 
NDTS 0.0353  0.03645 0  1.2236  0.0252  4.6027  72.4624 
DR 1.0969  190.2891  -12262.33  22338.75  0.3058  89.9581  12096.86 
GO 0.0347  0.0722  0  0.9386  0.0034  3.7089  21.3562 
AS 0.4404  0.2392  0  1  0.4270  0.1975  2.2073 
Size 13.8989  1.1848  8.1682  17.1111  13.8319  0.1376  2.7635 
ROA 0.0962  0.0884 -1.0258  3.5468 0.0792  4.8664  125.539 
CF 3.0095  190.4611  -330.2389  34019  0.4958  176.5502  31519.75 
Age 2.2706  0.7488  0  4.4659  2.3026  -0.4525  3.5494 
LIQ 1.9318  10.7829  0  1771.107  1.2886  139.1836  22486.3 
ETR: effective tax rate; NDTS: non–debt tax shields; DR: default risk; GO: growth opportunities; 
AS: asset structure; Size: firm size; ROA: profitability; CF: cash flow; Age: firm age; LIQ: liquidity. 
 
In Table 4 it is worth pointing out that the SMEs in our sample have an average 
effective tax rate of 28%, which is slightly less than the 30% tax rate officially 
established for small companies by Spanish tax legislation (Law 24/2001, 27 December, 
of Fiscal, Administrative and Social Order Measures). The average age of the SMEs 
analysed is 10 years – with the youngest company aged 5 and the oldest 87. The average 
profitability, in terms of profitability over assets, reached 9.62% for the period 1994–
1998. 
Table 5 gives the matrix of correlations among the different variables. It is worth 
noting that: (i) consistent with the predictions of pecking order theory, the analysis of 
correlations reveals a negative association between debt and firm profitability and, (ii) 
the negative correlation between debt and the effective tax rate contradicts the 
conventional belief that its sign should be positive.   15
Table 5. Correlation coefficients of the variables 
  Da  Db  ETR NDTS  DR  GO  AS  Size  ROA  CF  Age  LIQ 
Da  1.0000        
Db  0.9728 1.0000        
ETR  -0.0579 -0.0610 1.0000       
NDTS  -0.1174 -0.1128 -0.1168  1.0000     
DR  0.0001 -0.0015 0.0025 -0.0065  1.0000    
GO  0.0993 0.0885 -0.0308 0.2808  -0.0013 1.0000    
AS  0.0474 0.0454 -0.0942 0.0975  -0.0025 -0.1665 1.0000    
Size  -0.1305 -0.1261 0.0389 -0.0543  0.0045 -0.0287 0.0231 1.0000    
ROA  -0.1682 -0.1667 0.0326  0.0460 -0.0045 0.0321 -0.1271 -0.0402 1.0000    
CF  0.0071 0.0093 -0.0025  -0.0114  -0.0001 -0.0063 -0.0138 -0.0041 0.0074 1.0000   
AGE  -0.3388  -0.3523 0.0433 0.0146 0.0070 -0.0498 0.0195 0.4375 0.0705 -0.0142 1.0000 
LIQ  -0.1173 -0.1305 -0.0121 -0.0186 -0.0000 -0.0238 -0.0185 0.0143 0.0012 0.0002  0.0284  1.0000
 
5.  Panel data methodology 
The panel character of our data allows us to use panel data methodology for 
testing our capital structure models discussed in sections 2 and 3, simultaneously 
combining cross section and time series data. Panel models can be classified into 
dynamic and static models, depending on whether the lagged dependent variable is 
included, or not, in these models. Each kind of model needs a different estimation 
technique in order to achieve efficient and consistent estimators. Let’s see in the 
following subsections what that estimation process is and the main problems that arise 
from it. 
  A. Static panel 
In general terms, a static panel data model may be described by the following 
equation: 
it it i t it y= β x+ η +η +ε ⋅
2        [ 7 ]  
                                                 
2 This is the typical structure of the two-way error component model. The one-way error component 
model would not include the temporal specific effect  t η , and exclusively consider the firm specific effect.   16
where the terms incorporated in [7] are the same as those in equation [2], and which 
have already been explained in section 2 (epigraph A). 
In order to estimate the model of equation [7], we have to first identify whether 
the unobservable individual effects ( i η ) are random or fixed, that is, if these effects are 
orthogonal, or not, to the explanatory variables considered in the model. The 
implications of considering the individual effects as random or fixed are clearly 
different: in the first case (random effects), it is assumed that every individual effect is 
an unobservable random variable, independent of the explanatory variables, that belong 
to a compound random error term. In the second case (fixed effects), these effects are 
treated as a set of unknown coefficients that can be estimated with the rest of the model 
parameters. To verify the character of the individual effects in static panel data models, 
Hausman´s specification test is usually employed over the null hypothesis that the 
individual effects are not correlated with the independent variables [H0:  ii t E(η /x )=0]. In 
this sense, if we accept this null hypothesis the individual effects are supposed to be 
random and, in the opposite case they are supposed to be fixed effects. The random 
effects model ( ii t E(η /x )=0) needs Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimation, while 
the fixed effects model ( ii t E(η /x ) 0 ≠ ) can be estimated by Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) over the Within Group transformation
3. 
  B. Dynamic panel 
The second kind of panel models, dynamic, could be represented by the 
following mathematical structure (order 1): 
it it-1 it i t it y= y + β x+ η +η +ε α ⋅⋅        [ 8 ]  
The application of static estimations (epigraph A) to dynamic panel regressions, 
such as equation [8], that include many firms and a limited number of time 
observations, will result in inconsistent estimators due to correlations that could arise 
between the unobservable individual effects, the regressors and the error terms, and also 
due to the existence of regressor endogeneity (Baltagi, 1995). The general estimation 
approach for these cases, which has been developed in various econometrical literature 
                                                 
3 The Within Group regression applies Ordinary Least Squares to the original model [7] transformed or 
adjusted. The adjustment consists in subtracting the mean of every variable considered: dependent, 
explanatory and random error.   17
stances, is based on instrumental variables (IV) estimators (vid. Anderson and Hsiao, 
1981, 1982; Arellano and Bond, 1991; Ahn and Schmidt, 1995; Arellano and Bover, 
1995), and alternatively, on Generalized Moments Method (GMM) IV estimators 
(Chamberlain, 1984; Arellano and Bond, 1991; Ahn and Schmidt, 1995; Arellano and 
Bover, 1995). 
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) first suggested a consistent estimation technique for 
dynamic panel models. Specifically, they suggest  it-2 y ∆  (i.e.,  it-2 it-3 yy − ) assuming we 
have at least four time observations, or  it-2 y  (and also previous lags) as an instrument 
for the lagged dependent variable in first differences. Both instrument measures are 
correlated with  it-1 y ∆ , but uncorrelated with  it ε ∆  (depending only on  it ε  and  it-1 ε ), if 
the level error term  it ε  does not show serial correlation. The estimation is carried out by 
Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS). This IV technique will provide consistent estimations 
of model parameters, although not necessarily efficient, because (i) it does not use all 
the available moment conditions
4 and (ii) it does not consider the different structure of 
residual perturbances (Ahn and Schmidt, 1995). 
As a solution to the cited problems, Arellano and Bond (1991), using the GMM 
estimation technique, suggest a dynamic panel data estimator that optimally exploits the 
linear moment restrictions implicit in these kinds of models
5. Arellano and Bond (1991) 
prove that their GMM estimations provide lesser variances than those of the Anderson 
and Hsiao (1982) IV estimators. We can reason the former assertion by arguing that 
GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) enables increasing the instruments used 
in each period as we move throughout the panel, while the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) 
estimator employs, for instance, only ∆ yi,t-2 to instrument ∆ yi,t-1. The origin of the 
additional instruments stays on the orthogonality conditions that exist between the 
lagged values of the dependent variable and the random perturbances. This GMM 
methodology allows us to control for error correlation throughout the time, 
                                                 
4 The moment conditions are conditions over the covariance between the regressors and the error term. 
The regressors may be orthogonal to the error term, and if this is the case we can use orthogonality 
conditions, that is, the covariance between the regressors and the error term is zero. 
5 In general terms, a GMM estimator can be obtained for the true parameter, searching the element of the 
parameter space that enables the construction of a linear combination of the sample crossed parameters, 
as close to zero as possible (Hansen, 1982). 
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heteroskedasticity between the different firms, simultaneity, and measurement mistakes 
due to the use of orthogonality conditions of the variance–covariance matrix. 
The GMM estimator validity and consistency depends on the two following 
assumptions: (i) the lagged value of the dependent variable and other explanatory 
variables are valid instruments, and (ii) the error terms do not show serial correlation
6. 
The theoretical discussion carried out in this section leads us to formulate the 
following test for our three firm capital structure models: two of them (the trade-off 
model described by equation [3] and the pecking order model of equation [6]) will have 
to be estimated by instrumental variables because of their dynamicity or potential 
regressor endogeneity. On the contrary, the other pecking order model, formulated in 
equation [4], will be tested with static panel data methodology, due to its nearness to 
this kind of functional structure. 
6.  Empirical analysis and results 
From panel data of a 6482 non-financial Spanish small and medium enterprises 
sample, covering the five-year period 1994–1998, we have tested two groups of 
theoretical capital structure models, trying at the same time to identify the main 
determinants of SMEs financial policy. 
Several regressions were carried out to exploit the panel character of data, trying 
to control the potential endogeneity problems that could appear while testing the 
models. Likewise, we tried to control any time effect not contemplated in the models, 
and also capture the industry effect. 
Below we present a revision of the main results obtained in the research for 
every model, and the different proofs carried out to give robustness to the results. 
                                                 
6 For more details on the GMM estimator validity and consistency tests see Arellano and Bond (1991), 
and Arellano and Bover (1995).   19
  A. Trade-Off 
In this capital structure model, the estimation techniques employed are (i) Two 
Stage Least Squares (2SLS) in first differences with Anderson and Hsiao’s (1982) 
estimator, and (ii) GMM with Arellano and Bond’s (1991) estimator in first differences. 
We lose two cross sections in both estimations: one due to the lagged dependent 
variable (Dit-1) and another due to taking first differences to get rid of the firm specific 
effects ( i η ), covering the time period 1996–1998 and ending equation [3] of the model 
as, 
it it-1 it it-1 it-1 it-2 k k k t it-1 it it-1
k
D- D = ( D - D ) + β (V V )+(η -η )+(εε ) α ⋅⋅ − − ∑  
or, also: 
it it it-1 k k t it
k
D= D + β V+η + ε α ∆⋅ ∆ ⋅ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∑       [9] 
where ∆  represents first difference. 
IV techniques, such as the ones described above, enable us to control the 
endogeneity problems shown by certain explanatory variables. Specifically, both EA 
and ROA could present this kind of endogeneity problem. Consequently, these 
explanatory variables are not necessarily orthogonal to the error terms, and the OLS 
regression will result in skewed estimations. 
The GMM estimation shows two application levels: (i) Homocedastic one stage 
estimation and robust one stage estimation, and (ii) Two stage estimation. The latter 
alternative, which employs the residuals of the one stage estimation to construct an 
asymptotically weighted optimum matrix, is more efficient than the former if it is 
supposed that the perturbances show heteroskedasticity for relatively big sample data 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998). We will first employ the two-
stage estimation method and, afterwards, we will apply the one stage robust estimation 
method, in order to test the consistency of the results. 
Below, Table 6 reports the results obtained for the different estimations of our 
trade-off model [3] with OLS, or in its first differences structure [9], with 2SLS and 
GMM. Our purpose is to base the analysis on the GMM results, taking the OLS and the 
2SLS results as comparative references. All the estimations have been undertaken by 
the statistical software Stata 7.0 (vid. StataCorp., 2001).   20
Table 6. Estimation results of trade-off model [3] 
Explanatory variable  OLS  Anderson and Hsiao 
(1982), 2SLS 
Arellano and Bond 
(1991), GMM 






















































Number of firms 







Estimated coefficients, with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity between parentheses. ** and * 
denote that the coefficient is statistically significant at a 1% and a 5% level, respectively. All the models 
include time dummies, and sectoral dummies. The first of the estimations is carried out by OLS in levels. 
The Anderson and Hsiao’s (1982) column provides 2SLS estimations of the model in first differences, 
where  ∆ Dit-2 is used to instrument ∆ Dit-1. The GMM estimation takes the model in first differences 
where ∆ Dit-2, ∆ ASit-2, and ∆ ROA it-2 are used as instruments. The intercept coefficient is not included. 
Dependent variable: Da. 
 
Considering the results of the most powerful estimation (GMM) as our 
reference, the acceptance of hypotheses (1), (2), (3) and (7) is verified, while hypotheses 
(4), (5), (6), (8) and (9) are unconfirmed. These results suggest various reflections. 
The empirical evidence obtained indicates that SMEs have a target or optimum 
leverage ratio, which is explained as a function of some specific characteristics of the 
firm. Specifically, the estimated value of the parameter associated to the lagged leverage 
( it (1 λ ) α =− ) turned out to be 0.138, which indicates that the adjustment parameter 
would be approximately 0.862. The high value of this adjustment coefficient denotes 
the high adjustment speed of Spanish SMEs, which is very close to the target leverage. 
There are also appreciably reduced transaction costs as SMEs probably compare two 
kinds of costs when adjusting their capital structure: (i) the costs incurred when making 
the adjustment to the target leverage, and (ii) the costs of staying at an unbalanced 
position, that is, far from the target. In this manner, the adjustment coefficient will be   21
close to one if the costs of being unbalanced are very large compared to the costs of 
self-adjustment. Alternatively, such a coefficient will be close to zero if the adjustment 
costs are much higher than the unbalanced costs. Therefore, it can be deducted that 
Spanish SMEs seem to find the costs of an unbalanced position more burdensome than 
the costs of the self-adjustment process. 
As far as fiscal factors are concerned, the effective tax rate and the non–debt tax 
shields, we can highlight that both influence SME capital structure. To be precise, the 
estimated coefficient of the effective tax rate is positive and statistically significant, 
meaning that the more taxes SMEs have to pay the higher is the use of debt as a way to 
reduce tax bills. On the other hand, the existence of non-debt tax shields, such as 
depreciation, reduces the importance of the fiscal advantage of debt. 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, Table 6 shows a positive and statistically 
significant impact between growth opportunities and firm leverage. However, this 
positive relationship is consistent with the Michaelas et al. (1999) argument, based on 
the idea that in SMEs the trade off between independence and financing availability is 
more pronounced and the major part of debt financing is short term. In this way, the 
application to the SMEs of Myers´ (1977) underinvestment problem, which could be 
resolved by shortening debt maturity, implies that growth perspectives may be 
positively related to leverage. 
On the other hand, this positive sign could be affected by the proxy used to 
measure growth opportunities (the proportion represented by intangible assets over total 
assets), which includes, according to Spanish accounting rules, a large proportion of 
tangible assets, such as assets financed by leasing, patents, trademarks, etc., and 
therefore constitutes an imperfect measure of the cited variable. Although it is true that 
a vast majority of the empirical literature has adopted Tobin’s q ratio, or a research and 
development ratio, as a proxy for investment opportunities, it is practically impossible 
to get such information for SMEs, especially if the database employed is fed from the 
mercantile registry and abbreviated financial statements. 
As seen in Table 6, firm size and leverage are found to be positively related. 
This result is the same as that obtained by a considerable number of previous studies 
(Ocaña et al., 1994; Hutchinson, 1995; Chittenden et al., 1996; Berger and Udell, 1998; 
Michaelas et al., 1999; Romano et al., 2000). The explanation of this relationship could 
come from the fact that SMEs have to face higher bankruptcy costs, greater agency 
costs and bigger costs to resolve the higher informational asymmetries. Even within this   22
firm category, SMEs of greater size can access a higher leverage. Consequently, the 
hypothesis (7) of firm size is confirmed. 
Finally, Table 6 shows the non–significance of the variables default risk, asset 
structure, profitability and liquidity. Default risk has appeared to be not statistically 
significant under all the estimations techniques, although they all have shown a negative 
sign (in line with the theory), denoting that the higher a firm’s default risk, the lower the 
debt level. Asset structure, although not significant with GMM, appears with a 
significant and positive sign under 2SLS estimation, which would demonstrate the 
necessity of SMEs to provide collateral assets in order to obtain debt financing. As far 
as profitability and liquidity is concerned, the relationships obtained by OLS and 2SLS 
are in agreement with hypotheses (8) and (9), although they loose their significance 
with GMM. 
In short, we present in Table 7, both expected and actual relationships between 
the explanatory variables and the dependent variable of trade-off model according to 
GMM estimation: 
Table 7. Summary of the relations obtained for the trade-off model [3] 
Explanatory variable  Expected relation  Actual relation 
Dit-1 +  + 
ETR +  + 
NDTS -  - 
DR -  n.s. 
GO -  + 
AS +  n.s 
Size +  + 
ROA -  n.s 
LIQ +/-  n.s 
D: total debt ratio. ETR: effective tax rate. NDTS: non-debt tax shields. DR: default risk. GO: growth 
opportunities. AS: asset structure. Size: firm size. ROA: profitability. LIQ: liquidity. n.s.: not significant. 
 
B. Pecking order 
According to the theoretical discussion of section 3, we aim to test the pecking 
order approach with two models. The first is formulated by equation [4], which can be 
summed up as:   23
it it i t it D= β FD +η+η +ε α ∆+ ⋅  
This expression cannot include increasing capital as a mode of financing because 
the pecking order theory considers this source as the last option. In order to be sure that 
firms only choose debt financing once they have completely exhausted their internal 
resources, and that they will not increase capital beforehand, equation [4] will be 
estimated over a SMEs subsample within the 6482 SME global sample, which had not 
increased capital throughout the analysis period (1994-1998). Once applied the previous 
filter, from the original 6482 SMEs we find 1092 SMEs that increased their capital at 
some time, so that our definitive subsample mounts up to 5390 SMEs (26950 
observations). 
Again using the statistical package Stata 7.0 (StataCorp., 2001), the results 
obtained by the OLS, GLS, and the Within Group estimations are the following: 
Table 8. Estimation results of pecking order model [4] 
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Estimated coefficients, with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity between parentheses. ** and * 
denote that the coefficient is statistically significant at a 1% and a 5% level, respectively. The random 
effects estimation is carried out by GLS and the fixed effects estimation applies OLS to the Within Group 
estimator. Dependent variable: ∆ Da. 
 
As we can see from Table 8, the hypothesis formulated for this first model of 
pecking order is not completely fulfilled for our sample of SMEs. Despite having 
carefully selected the SMEs subsample to test the pecking order model [4], it has been 
difficult to clearly confirm that Spanish SMEs adjust their debt level to their financing 
requirements. The beta parameter, as shown in Table 8, although significant by any of 
the estimation techniques, shows a value close to zero and, therefore, very far from what 
it should be in theory (i.e., one). 
The second of the pecking order models that is also tested is the one represented 
by equation [6], with the following mathematical expression:   24
it 1 it 2 it 3 it i t it D= β (CF) +β (Age) +β (GO) +η+η +ε α +⋅ ⋅ ⋅  
The inclusion of variable CF in this model, whose endogeneity has been 
previously highlighted in the empirical evidence (Hernando and Vallés, 1992), justifies 
the instrumental variable (IV) estimation. This estimation is undertaken on the original 
model in first differences and by 2SLS, the method upon which we will base our 
analysis. Nevertheless, as previously, we will also add OLS estimation as a comparison 
and to perfect the analysis. 
Any dichotomic variable that is constant throughout the time (such as industry 
dummies), will not be contemplated in the estimation with first differences, as they will 
be erased when taking time differences for each firm of the panel. Something similar 
occurs with the variable Age, because it is defined as the number of years of an SME´s 
life and it increases one unit per year, taking a constant value equal to one in a model 
with first differences. In order to ease this problem, we will use the natural logarithm of 
Age. Both Age and growth opportunities (GO) are considered exogenous in our analysis, 
while we assume that CF is endogenous. 
Using Stata 7.0 (StataCorp., 2001), the estimation of the pecking order model [6] 
has provided us the following results: 
Table 9. Estimation results of pecking order model [6] 
Explanatory variable  OLS  2SLS 
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Estimated coefficients, with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity between parentheses. ** and * 
denote that the coefficient is statistically significant at a 1% and a 5% level, respectively. The first of the 
estimations corresponds to OLS in levels, while the second provides 2SLS estimations, with Anderson 
and Hsiao’s (1982) estimator, of the model in first differences. In this latter estimation, ∆ CFit-2 is used to 
instrument ∆ CFit. The intercept coefficient is not included. Dependent variable: Da. 
 
Given the 2SLS results from Table 9, we find that all the formulated hypotheses 
for this pecking order model (1), (2) and (3) are verified.   25
Cash flow is negatively related to firm leverage, so that those SMEs that 
generate most internal resources are the ones with a lower leverage. This result is 
consistent with pecking order theory predictions, which point to firms’ preferences for 
financing their investments using internal resources instead of external resources. 
The results presented in Table 9 show a negative and statistically significant 
impact of age upon SMEs financing. The older SMEs may have generated sufficient 
internal resources to not depend as much on debt as the younger SMEs, whose 
dependence on external resources will be greater. 
Finally, the hypothesis referred to growth opportunities in the scope of pecking 
order theory is fulfilled, obtaining a positive and significant relation between this 
variable and firm leverage. The previous relationship was already found in the trade-off 
model. In short, those SMEs that have more investment opportunities will need more 
financing resources, forcing them to resort to debt financing. 
The empirical testing of both pecking order models proposed in our study, have 
provided the following results: 
Table 10. Summary of the relations obtained for the pecking order models [4] and [6] 
Explanatory variable  Expected relation  Actual relation 
FD +  ( 1) +  ( 0) 
CF -  - 
Age -  - 
GO +  + 
FD: financing deficit. CF: cash flow. Age: firm age. GO: growth opportunities. n.s.: not significant. 
 
The apparent disparity of the results of both pecking order models, as shown in 
Table 10, could be due to the small length of the data and also to the difficulties to 
measure the Financing Deficit (FD) variable. 
  C. Robustness of the results 
A set of tests was undertaken on our models to verify the degree of consistency 
and robustness of the results obtained.   26
In the GMM estimation (trade–off model), Sargan´s test of overidentifying 
restrictions was carried out, whose associated statistic is asymptotically distributed as 
chi–square under the null hypothesis of instrument validity. This test is important 
because the GMM estimator provides consistent estimations only if a valid set of 
instruments is employed. Its value, given in Table 11, denotes that we can accept the 
null hypothesis on the suitability of instruments for a 15.56% significance level. 
Likewise we have carried out the tests of absence of both first and second order 
autocorrelation of residuals. Again, the consistency of the GMM estimators relies on the 
absence of the cited correlations, though it is true that the key serial correlation of the 
residuals is the second order correlation, enabling the first order correlation to adopt a 
value different from zero (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The values of these tests, which 
are also presented in Table 11, confirm the absence of second order autocorrelation. 
Table 11. Statistics tests for the trade-off model [3] 
  OLS  Anderson and Hsiao 
(1982), MC2E 
Arellano and Bond 
(1991), MGM 
1




nd order autocorrelation  ---  ---  0 
Wald test 1 (d.f.) 







Wald test 2 (d.f.) 




Wald test 3 (d.f.) 




Sargan test (d.f.) 
P - value (




d.f.: degrees of freedom. The first two tests indicate the existence, or not, of first and second order 
autocorrelation, respectively, in the residuals. Wald test 1 is a test of joint significance of the estimated 
coefficients. Wald test 2 is a test of joint significance of the time dummies. Wald test 3 is a test of joint 
significance of the industry dummies. The Sargan test enables us to verify the suitability of the 
instruments; the degrees of freedom are calculated, in this case, as the difference between the number of 
instruments and regressors. 
 
To test the degree of joint significance of the regressors, Wald´s test (Fisher-
Snedecor F statistic) was undertaken in three ways: (i) on the estimated coefficients, 
which is asymptotically distributed as chi–square under the null hypothesis of no   27
relationship, (ii) on the time dummies and (iii) on the industry dummies. Its values are 
included in Tables 11 and 12, and according to those results we reject the null 
hypothesis of relationship absence and, therefore, the joint significance of all the 
variables is confirmed. 
We sum up the information of the previous tests for every estimated model in 
Tables 11 and 12. 
Table 12. Statistics tests for the pecking order models [4] and [6] 










Wald test (d.f.) 
P – value (F) 
157.85 (1) 






Wald test (d.f.) 
P - value (
2 χ ) 
---  157.85 (1) 
0.0000  ---    
d.f.: degrees of freedom. Test of joint signification of the estimated coefficients. 
 
We have meticulously examined to see if the variables employed in the study are 
predetermined or, in contrast, they are strictly exogenous regarding the error term. The 
validity of the instruments depends on the relation between the regressors and the 
random error. In order to test if xit is predetermined or not with respect to  it ε , we start 
using instruments with 2 lags for every variable included in the set of instruments. We 
next add xi,t-1 to the existing instruments to analyse the potential bias that could appear 
from the correlation between xi,t-1 and the error term with first differences  it ε ∆ . If there 
really is a measurement error, then the estimated coefficients of the explanatory 
variables should be reduced, which would suggest a downward bias due to the joint 
determination of xi,t-1 and  it-1 ε . Repeating the previous procedure for every variable, we 
can see if there is, or not, some predetermined variable with respect to  it ε . We also 
checked the possibility of strict endogeneity of the variables with respect to  it ε  
including current values. If the estimations of the coefficients are reduced, then we can 
conclude that none of the variables is strictly exogenous with respect to  it ε . 
Furthermore, we carried out the estimation analysis with alternative 
measurements of the dependent variable and some other firm specific characteristics   28
(effective tax rate, size, age), without obtaining significant differences from the original 
estimations
7. 
Lastly, we have estimated the capital structure trade-off model [3], by the one 
stage robust GMM version, without substantially differing from the results of the two-
stage version. The results are given in Table 13. 




ETR  0.049** 
(0.012) 
NDTS  -0.420* 
(0.183) 
DR  -0.000 
(0.000) 
GO  0.058* 
(0.028) 
AS  -0.009 
(0.013) 
Size  0.211** 
(0.009) 
ROA  0.014 
(0.028) 
LIQ  -0.0002 
(0.0002) 
Number of firms 
Number of observations 
6468 
12910 
Estimated coefficients, with standard errors robust to 
heteroskedasticity between parentheses. ** and * denote 
that the coefficient is significant at a 1% and a 5% level, 
respectively. Dependent variable: total debt ratio (Da). 
 
                                                 
7 If requested, further information is available from the authors.   29
7. Conclusions 
This paper shows empirical evidence related to the capital structure of small and 
medium sized Spanish companies as taken from a large data panel covering the period 
1994–1998. The hypotheses tested were derived from pecking order and trade-off 
models. In general, both theoretical approaches appear to help explain the financial 
behaviour of these companies and the results obtained can be considered robust. 
Regarding trade-off theory, the results clearly indicate the existence of an 
optimal or target debt level where firms partially converge – the transaction costs not 
being excessively high. The evidence seems to confirm that Spanish SMEs adjust their 
target ratio very quickly – faster than publicly listed companies. Our parameter for 
adjustment speed, α , was 0.86 compared to the estimate of 0.79 produced by Miguel 
and Pindado (2001) for Spanish listed companies. In addition, the adjustment coefficient 
obtained is clearly higher than that found at the United States of America by Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999) – 0.41 – and Fama and French (2002) – 0.07-0.1 for dividend 
firm payers and 0.15-0.18 for non–payers. Small Spanish firms seem to find the costs of 
an unbalanced position higher than the costs of the process of adjustment. As a result, it 
is confirmed that bank financing, typical in these companies, offers more advantages 
than obtaining funds from the capital markets. 
With respect to pecking order theory, the reduced value parameter β  (equation 
[4]) seems to indicate that small Spanish firms do not adjust their level of debt to their 
financial needs. It is possible that this relation would improve with a larger data panel, 
as the econometric techniques used have limited our analysis period. Nevertheless, the 
hypotheses put forward regarding cash flows, firm age, and growth opportunities have 
been clearly confirmed.   30
APPENDIX 
Table A.1. Dependent variables description 
Total Debt Ratio Da 
Total debt
Total debt Equities +
 






Table A.2. Explanatory variables description 
Effective Tax Rate (ETR) 
Taxes
EAIBT
, where EAIBT denotes 
Earnings after Interest and before 
Tax. 
Non-Debt Tax Shields (NDTS) 
Depreciation
Total assets
, where Depreciation is 
taken as a flow variable. 
Default Risk (DR) 
Interests expenses
EBIT
, where EBIT 
denotes Earnings before Interest and 
Tax. 

















Age  Natural logarithm of number of years 
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Table A.3. Capital structure models 
TRADE-OFF [3]  it it it-1 k k i t it
k
D= + D + β V+ η+η +ε δα ⋅⋅ ∑  
PECKING ORDER [4]  it it-1 it i t it D- D =+ β FD +η+η +ε α ⋅  
PECKING ORDER [6]  it 1 it 2 it 3 it i t it D= + β CF +β Age+ β GO +η+η +ε α ⋅⋅ ⋅  
 
Table A.4. Empirical hypotheses 
TESTED HYPOTHESES  MODEL 
 
(1) “Firms follow a process of capital structure adjustment that leads to 
an optimal leverage level over the long-term” 
 
(2) “The effective tax rate should be positively related to the debt level” 
 
(3) “Non–debt tax shields ought be negatively related to firm debt” 
 
(4) “Default risk should be negatively related to the firm’s debt ratio” 
 
(5) “Companies with greater growth opportunities will have a smaller 
debt ratio” 
 
(6) “Firm debt is positively related with assets tangibility” 
 
(7) “The size of the company should be positively related to the level of 
debt” 
 
(8) “There should be a negative relationship between debt ratio and 
firm’s profitability” 
 
(9) “A firm’s liquidity affects the firm’s capital structure” 
 
TRADE – OFF [3] 
 





(1) “Firm debt level should be negatively related to the volume of firm 
cash flows” 
 
(2) “The age of a company should be negatively related to its debt level” 
 
(3) “Firms with few investment opportunities and high cash flows should 
have low debt levels, while firms with strong growth perspectives and 




   32
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